Washington, D.C.—The following are opening remarks from Ranking Member of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Rick Larsen (D-WA) and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management Dina Titus (D-NV) during today’s hearing titled, “Examining the Effectiveness of the Federal Protective Service: Are Federal Buildings Secure?”
Video of Larsen’s and Titus’ opening statements are here and here.
More information on the hearing can be found here.
Ranking Member Larsen:
Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Perry and Subcommittee Ranking Member Titus, for calling today’s hearing on the security of federal buildings.
Thank you, also, to our witnesses. Commissioner Doomes and Director Marroni, I appreciate you once again making time to discuss federal facility issues with the Subcommittee. Commissioner Cline, I recognize that you currently have heavy demands on your time and attention, so I appreciate your participation today.
Prior to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, the federal government had no established approach to security for federally owned or leased facilities.
Immediately following the bombing, President Clinton directed the Department of Justice to assess the vulnerability of federal facilities to terrorist attacks and to develop recommendations for minimum security standards.
Despite agency-wide coordination and the establishment of the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) process, federal facility security has remained on the Government Accountability Office’s High-Risk list for the past 21 years.
In 2022, a GAO study found that from 2017 through 2021 FPS made more than 25,000 security recommendations at nearly 5,000 federal facilities. While facility security committees approved 27% percent of the FPS recommended countermeasures, most of those countermeasures were not implemented.
The FPS has other significant challenges. Hiring and retaining law enforcement staff has been difficult. IT systems developed specifically to track and verify contract guard training and certifications are not reliable.
Entry access points are not always staffed, and GAO’s covert testing program has found that contract guards did not consistently detect prohibited items when screening bags.
Also of concern is a heightened risk of political protests at federal facilities around the country and the use of drones near federal facilities and at high profile public events.
This hearing is taking place at a particularly important time of political and social unease.
I hope today’s witnesses will share their ideas for improving the security of federal buildings and the safety of the employees who work there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ranking Member Titus:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witness for joining us today to discuss the state of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the security of our federal buildings.
As the law enforcement agency tasked with protecting the more than 9,000 GSA—owned and leased facilities, the FPS is responsible for keeping these workplaces safe for the thousands of federal employees and citizens who visit every day.
Ensuring the FPS has the resources it needs to keep people and property secure, while facing a wide range of threats, is critical to keeping our government functioning.
In recent history, we have seen the dangerous situations and threats posed to federal buildings including plane crashes, car bombings and active shooters, and the FPS needs to be prepared to address any of these situations and more.
Currently, DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) heads the Interagency Security Committee which sets the security standards that need to be met by federal facilities. Based on these standards, the FPS can identify risks and recommend actions to mitigate those risks, including through additional resources such as screening equipment and security cameras.
Among my many concerns is that even though the FPS has sent thousands of these assessments to federal agencies, many of their recommendations are ignored, and it’s apparent that as a result there are numerous vulnerabilities that need to be addressed.
In reading the testimony of Mr. Marroni, it is shocking to know that when GAO conducted covert tests to test some of these security vulnerabilities, FSP contract guards were unable to detect weapons ranging from batons to multi-purpose tools with knives in half of the tests. What’s more concerning is that when the FPS conducted its own covert testing, this time with firearms and components for making improvised explosive devices, the detection rate was almost identical.
I appreciate the work of the FPS and its contractors, and the potential harms they face every day, but these exposures are unacceptable which is why I look forward to today’s hearing so we can learn more on the extent of the problem and where changes should be made.
I thank the witnesses for joining us today, and I yield back.
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